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1. INTRODUCTION 
.[ 
The theory of oligopoly studies how the behavior of 
interdependent firms yields a market equilibrium. This approach 
usually consists of a description of the basic economy -cost and 
demand functions-, sorne assumptions on how firms react to each 
other -Cournot, Bertrand, etc-, a proof of the existence, and in 
certain cases uniqueness and stability, of equilibrium and an 
analysis of the properties of this equilibrium. 
This research program has produced fundamental insights on 
understanding of oligopoly but is not free from trouble: the 
structure of the game -the class of admissible strategies (prices 
vs. quantities) and the timing (one-shot,etc)- are taken as given, 
and there are several classes of behavior and objectives of firms 
which are equally plausible. In other words equilibrium, if it 
exists, is indeterminate (this is the so-called folk theorem of' 
game theory, see Kalai-Fershtman-Judd (1987) p.2). 
A possible way to reduce the multiplicity of equilibria !s to 
impose a rationality criterion (perfectness or the like). However 
this approach is not always successful since the subgame 
perfectness concept imposes no real restriction in repeated games" 
(van Damme (1987) p. 165). A more subtle difficulty is the 
following: suppose that in a symmetric game a player makes crazy 
choices (and looks crazy too !) but she does at least as góod in 
terms of payoffs as any other playero Can she be called 
irrational? (certainly she is successful !). Or more generally, 
why rationality -Le. informed maximization of utility- should be 
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central to economic modeling? Up to my knowledge there are two 
possible answers. On the one hand it may be argued that rational 
behavior, as opposed to the chaos of irrationality, yields 
clear-cut conclusions. On the other hand there is the presumption 
that irrational players will be wiped out by the rational ones. 
However we have seen that rational behavior indeed produces a very 
large set of equilibria. Also the assertion that only rational 
players survive has not been proved. Furthermore as Koopmans 
(1957) points out " if this is the basis of our belief in profit 
maximization then we should postulate that basis itself and not 
the profit maximization which it implies in certain circumstances" 
(p. 140). 
In this paper, we try to overcome the excessive multiplicity 
of equilibria over imposing on the usual equilibrium story a 
natural selection mechanism of the following sort. Suppose that 
firms can select their behavior from a set of reaction functions. 
Each of these functions might be rationalized as arising from sorne 
maximization program (Le. maximization of profits, sales, etc for 
sorne given conjectures). A behavior may be understood as a type. 
We will say that a type is a survivor if no matter how other firms 
behave (Le. the type they choose) this firm obtains at least as 
much profits as any competitor (see Definitions 1 and 2). In other 
words we would expect that a type survives in a market if the 
profits generated by this behavior overcome the profits obtained 
, by competitors with any possible behavior. The idea behind that is 
that profits can be used as a buffer again:ot bad times or to 
! expand the firmo Also the possibility of survival in the event of 
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a price war is positively related to the quantity of profits. This 
suggests that to choose a survivor type may be rational in sorne 
sense. In the Sections 3 and 5 we will discuss the relationship 
between rationality and surviving behavior. 
We will show that the introduction of evolutive 
considerations may help to solve the multiplicity problem 
mentioned before. In Proposition 1 we prove that the Walrasian 
type (Le. the reaction function which arises from the maximization 
of profits taken the market price as given) is a survivor type. 
co~;oersely, under smoothness, symmetry and concavity assumptions 
the market equilibrium arising from firms which select survivor 
types is a Walrasian Equilibrium. This is our Proposition 2. We 
also show that under increasing returns and more than two firms 
there are no survivors (Proposition 3). Finally Proposition 4 
applies a weaker notion -namely that of a successful type- to 
markets in which average cósts are decreasing. It is shown there 
that optimistic firms (those choosing higher outputs) are 
successful types. 
The rest of the paper goes as follows. The next Section 
explains the basic economy we are working with. In Section 3 we 
define the basic evolutive concepts and their relationship with 
"Rational" behavior. Section 4 gathers our main results. Finally 
Section 5 offers sorne comments on the significance of results. 
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2. THE MODEL 
There is a homogeneous market served by n > 1 firms. Let N 
be the set of firms. Let us denote by A the set of states of 
nature with finite cardinality m. Let be the true 
probability distribution of the states of nature. The price of the 
product is denoted by p. Let p = p(x,a) be the inverse demand 
function where a e A and x = LXi' being xI the output of firm 
leN 
i. The range of variation of X is taken to be compact and convexo 
Firms have identical te~hnologies2 which are represented by a 
common cost function dxl,a) such that dO,a) = ° Va e A. 
Therefore for given a e A profits for firm can be written as 
Notice that this profit 
function is identical for aU firms. True expected profits for 
As we remarked in the Introduction, the behavior of any two 
firms may be different. EssentiaUy, behavior of a firm, is 
determined by the foUowing items. 
a) The objectives to be maximized (Le. sales, profits, 
etc.). If the firm foUows a rule of thumb such as a fixed output 
or price equals average cost plus a given markup, this can be 
interpreted as the minimization of the distance between these 
2 
The reason why we assume ldentlcal firma ls that we want to 
racuss In dlfferences In behavlor, 1.e. we do not want a flrm to 
be a survlvor Just because lt ls more efflclent. 
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'1 
I 
targets (Le. the output or the markup in the aboye examples) and 
the actualpolicies. assumed to be feasible. 
b) Subjective probabilities about the occurrence of the 
elements of A plus a Von Neumann-Morgestern utility function 
reflecting the firm's attitude toward risk and defined over the 
objectives described in part a) aboye. 
c) Conjectures held by a firm about how x reacts to xI (Le. 
Cournot. Bertrand. Walrasian or Perfectly Competitive. etc.) 
We formalize this by saying that every firmo say i. is of 
sorne type ti which belong to the set of possible types for this 
firm TI' Let T '" TTIENTI and T_I '" TTJ .. ITJ with typical elements t 
and t_
1 
respectively. In general T will be a functional space Le. 
a space of reaction functions. An interesting special case arises 
when a type specifies an output. The interpretation of this case 
is that the firm is committed to sorne particular output. If the 
set TI consist of aH possible outputs for firm i we will say that 
T/or T) is a direct space. 
Given the set of firms and a profile of types. Le. a 
behavior for each firmo let us denote by the 
mapping which yields equilibrium outputs given a profile of types 
t E T. This mapping will be caHed the equilibrium mapping. The 
first n components are outputs for firms 1. .... n. and the last 
component is total output. Le. 
In general let types 
e(t) = (xI' .... x. 
n 
x). 
t ..... t be 
I n 
represented by reaction 
X 
-1 
represents a list of 
! aH outputs except xI' The values in the range of each f I ( 
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represent the output set by the corresponding firm as a function 
of outputs of other firms. Then. e(\ ..... t
n
) is the fixed point 
of these correspondences3. 
Assumption 1. Ifi E N, Ti contains onty aU upper-hemicontinuous 
and convex-vatued correspondences. 
The role of this assumption. is twofold. On the one hand it 
implies -via Kakutani fixed point theorem- the existence of e( ) 
(see Roberts-Sonnenschein (1977) for examples in which an 
,~( equilibrium fails to exist). On the other hand it guarantees that 
type spaces are "rich" enough so most oligopoly theories are 
covered. We will also assumé that e(t) is single valued 1ft E T. We 
do not justify this assumption here since it, will be shown to hold 
under not unreasonable conditions (see Assumptions 3-6 and the 
second step' in Proposition 2 below). Moreover our definitions can 
be adapted to a multi-valued e( ) at cost of sorne complications. 
In the next Section we over impose on the equilibrium story. 
Le. the mapping e( ). a Natural Selection mechanism in order to 
see which type will survive 
3 
arbltrary functlon (x l there l. a Notlce that glven an 
-1 
2 
that If f I (x_ll. utlllty functlon U = xl·f I (x_ 1 l-x/ 2 such xI I 
xI maxlrnizes thls utlllty functlon for glven x -l' 1.e. 
any 
reactlon functlon can be ratlonallzed. 
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3. THE NATURAL SELECTION MECHANISM 
Let us think of firms as having an exogenous behavior which 
may be subject to (possibly random) changes, Leo mutationso 
Alternatively we may think of firms imitating the behavior of the 
otherso Intuitively a firm will survive if its type matched 
against any other possible type will yield an expected profit for 
this firm greater or equal than profits of any other firmo In 
other words a firm survives in a market if it sticks to sorne 
behavior and no matter what competitors do, it does as least as 
good as any of themo 
It must be remarked that the aboye idea do es not necessarily 
implies that agent are single mindedo On the contrary there may be 
very sophisticated players (belonging to sorne type say, ti sorne 
i E N). The purpose of our analysis is to identify which kind of 
behavior (sophisticated or not) will survive in the long runo 
A possible motivation for the concept of survivor is that 
expected profits can be interpreted as measure of the future 
growth of the firm (Leo its reproductive power 4)0 Therefore a 
survivor is a firms whose growth possibilities are not over taken 
by any competitoro Alternatively, relative expected profits can be 
thought as indicating the relative probability of survival of a 
firm subject to large random shocks and/or a price waro 
must be remarked that under uncertalnty, 
measures oC the expected reproductlve power 
instance the mean and the variance oC proflts- are posslble. 
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more complex 
-lnvolvlng COI' 
Definition 1.- Type t'is a survivor if 3i such· that t' E TI and 
V t o E T o 
-1 -1 
we have that if e(t' ,t -i) = (x~, ... , x', X') 
n 
E(x;,x') '" E(X;,X') Vj E No 
In order to see clearly what is involved in Definition 1 we 
may rewrite it in a different formo Let 
indirect expected profit function of firm i, l.eo 
v (t ,t ) - E(e (t),e (t)) where eje 
I I -1 I n+! 
is the /h component of 
r e( ), j = 1, .. o, n+10 Then, we have 
Definition 2.- t' is a survivor if 3i such that t' E T and I 
At it is clear, this definition bea~s sorne similarity with 
the concept of an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (see Jo Maynard 
Smith (1982))0 Main differences are that we require that survival 
is a global property (Leo Vt) instead of a local one, that 
survivors do not mutate and that we do not impose any symmetry on 
the types of firmso These features reflect that in economics, 
mutations are not random but they are conciously made by agents in 
the hope of obtaining better resultso Therefore if a firm behaves 
in such a way that it obtains more profits than their competitors 
a mutation of this firm is very unlikelyo Conversely those firms 
fearing badly are good candidates to change their behavioro 
EXAMPLE 1. In Table 1 below we present an abstract situation with 
n = 2 and three types for each agento As usual entries represent 
expected profits for firms 1 and 20 It is easily seen that no type 
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¡, 
I 
is a survivor. If for example firm 1 takes t = 1, firm 2 can 
I 
obtain more profits choosing t
2
= 3, so on and so forth. 
(INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
The fact that there are more than two strategies is essential 
for the aboye example. In fact it is easy to prove that if the 
game is symmetric and we have two players and two strategies for 
each of them. a survivor type exists. For instance in a 
Prisoners-Dilemma situation if types are identified with 
strategies it can be proved that the strategy "To Confess" (Le. 
to defect unilaterally from the cooperative agreement) is the 
unique survivor type. However since there are important cases in 
which there are no survivor types (e.g. when there are increasing 
returns) it will be useful to have a weaker concepto Therefore we 
consider the following definition which requires only "locally 
successful" behavior. In order to do that. let us assume h t at TI' 
i = l. . ..• n are metric spaces and let us denote by B (c.d) the 
intersection of a ball with center c E T d d· d with T . 
_1 an ra lUS _1 
Definition 3. Let t a given profile. t 
1 
successful type in the profile t if 315 > O such that 
B(t_I,r), IJr < 15 we have that 
is a 
IJt' E 
-1 
In words a type is successful in a given profile. if it does 
as good as any other possible type for small mutations of 
¡ competitors. 
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We now discuss the relationship between surviving and 
rational behavior. A natural definition of rational behavior is 
that firms choose their types in order to maximize expected 
utility. 
Definition 4. (t~, ... , t~) is Rational if lJi E N we have that 
v (t ,t" ) 1 1 -1 IJt E T 1 1 
In words. a profile is Rational if it is a Nash Equilibrium 
in which types are the strategies of the game. Special cases of 
this equilibrium are Reasonable Conjectural Equilibrium (see Hahn 
(1978). Grossman (1981). Hart (1985) and Klemperer and Meyer 
(1989». Incentive Equilibrium (see Fershtman-Judd (1987). Sklivas 
(1987) Vickers (1985). and Corchón-Silva (1989» and the 
Manipulative Nash Equilibrium studied in the theory of mechanisms 
for resource allocation (for general surveys see Hurwicz (1985) 
and Thomson (1985). For an application to the Oligopoly case see 
Alkan-Sertel (1981». This concept is appealing but. in general. 
it produces too many equilibria5. 
It is easy to find examples in which no rational type is a 
survivor and viceversa. For instance in. Table 1 a Rational profile 
exists (namely ti = tz =3) but there are no survivor types. This 
implies that the connexion between rational and surviving behavior 
must be found elsewhere (see p. 21 and Section 5 for additional 
comments on this issue). 
5 Klemperer and Meyer obtaln unlqueness of the Ratlonal proflle 
under strong condltlons. 
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4. RESULTS 
In this Section we present our main findings. First we define 
a specific type of firm which will play an important role in 
Proposition 1 below. We will say that a type is Walrasian, if its 
objectives are profits, it is risk neutral with Rational 
Expectations (L e. it has the correct probability distribution 
over A) and it conjecture that· x does not depend on xi' Le. it is 
a price-taker. It must be noticed that the al!ocation resulting 
from al! firms being Walrasian is not a PerfectIy Competitive 
Equilibrium in the sense of General Equilibrium (see e.g. 
Arrow-Hahn (1971) cap. 5), since we are assuming that there are no 
contingent markets. Rather, it is an equilibrium in the sense used 
in the Rational Expectations literature. In order to simplify 
notation let b .. x . 
-1 
Definition 5. A reaction correspondence f w is caUed the WaLrasian 
type if f (b) =( x.eR / E(x.,Xi+b) '" E(x'i,xi+b) V x: e R J. 
w L + L L + 
It must be noticed that f w i§ not the usual supply function, so 
we need to show that f w belongs to the class of admissible types 
according to assumption 1. We first assume 
Assumption 2.· Va e A, cost and lnverse demand functions satisfy: 
a) c( ) is continuously differentiable. 
b) dcCxi,a) / dXi (denoted as c') ls non decreasing on xi' 
e) 3 y such that p(y',a) < c'(y',a) Vy''''Y. 
i d) p( ) ls strictly decreaslng and continuous on x. 
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Lemma 1. Under assumption 2, f w exists, it is singLe-vaLued and 
continuous. 
Proof: Existence of f w is equivaLent to find, far a given b, an 
x/ such that if 8E(O,O+b)/8x i > O then 8E(xi',x/+b)/8XtO, since 
if the first inequaUty is reversed O e f w(b) (notice that in 
order to compute 8E(· )/8x. we assume that x is heLd fixed). By 
cJ L 
assumption 2 c) 3 y such that 8E(y,b+y)/8xi < O. Then, the mean 
vaLue theorem yields the reSulto . 
Now, Let us prove singLe-valuedness. Suppose it is not and 
let u e f w(b) and v e f w(b) with u > V. Then E(u,u+b,) '" E(v,u+b,) 
and E(v,v+b,) '" E(u,v+b,). Combining these inequalities we get 
(u-v)'(a~A.qa.(p(u+b,a)-p(v+b,a)) '" O 
and thls contradicts that p( ) is stricUy decreasing. 
Fin.aUy continuity foUows triviaUy from the continuity of 
p( ) and c( ) •• 
Now we are ready to prove our first resulto 
Proposition 1. Under assumptions 1 and 2 f w is a survivor. 
Proof: Suppose f wis not a survivor. Therefore 3j and a t~1 e T_
1 
such that if (x;, ... , x~,x') = e(f w,t_/ then E(X;,x') > E(X;,x') 
However from the definition of a Walrasian type we have that 
E(x;,x') 
Therefore we have reacheda contradiction and the Propositión 
is proved .• 
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Figure 1 shows how Proposition 1 works. For any given t E T 
we have an equilibrium total output. say x·. Therefore the values 
of E(xl,x*) '" El represent expected profits for firms 1. .. .• n 
given their outputs. which are measured in the horizontal axis. 
The maximum of this function corresponds precisely with the output 
set by the Walrasian type. In other words. the Walrasian type is a 
survivor since it takes the price -which is common for a11 firms-
as given and maximizes accordingly. 
(INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE). 
Notice that an implication of Proposition 1 is that if a 
firmo say i. takes the Walrasian type. ,,11 firms selecting 
survivor types must be producing the Walrasian output (but they 
are not necessarily of Walrasian type). Therefore the question is 
whether Walrasian equilibrium results from any survivor type. In 
order to prove that let us assume the fo11owing 
Assumption 3. E() is a continuously differentiabLe function. 
Assumption 4. V i,j E N, T = T S; Rk 
I j 
Assumption 5. e( ) is generated by a Nash Equilibrium in 
quantities in which each. firm maximizes a continuousLy 
differentiabLe function U : R2 x T. ~ R, U = U (x, x, t) for 
I + 1 I I I I 
given outputs of its competitors. ALso Vt E T, e(t) » O. 
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In order to interpret Assumptions 4 and 5 we may think of a 
firm as having sorne weighted sum of profits. sales. etc. as its 
objective. A type specifies a) these weights. b) a probability 
distribution on A and c) the risk aversion measured by sorne 
parameters. At cost of sorne additional complications. conjectures 
may also be considered. Alternatively we may think of TI as ·direct 
spaces and D
I
( as the Euclidean distance between the type 
(output) of the firm and any other possible output. It is easy to 
show that assumption 5 also holds in this case. 
A necessary condition for a Nash Equilibrium is 
In order to save notation let us denote the left hand side of 
Assumption 6. RI (xl,x,tl) is a) stricUy decreasing on XI for 
given X and decreasing on x for given XI and b) never constant 
(not even LocaHy) on ti' 
The second part of Assumption 6 means that different types 
will generate different behavior. An immediate consequence of the 
first part is that U I ( ) is concave on X l' In order to relate this 
assumption to we11-known cases we may assume that firms maximize 
profits. and have point expectations on A (however their 
expectations may differ). The space TI corresponds here to A. 
Then. Assumption 6 a) implies that Va E A. 
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and 
dp(x,a)/dx + d2c(x ,a)/dx2 < O 
I I 
These are the usual assumption in the Cournot model in order 
to prove existenceand uniqueness of equilibrium (see Friedman 
(1982) p. 496). Another case in which Assumption 6 is satisfied is 
when TI are direct spaces and the behavior of the firm is 
summarized by the minimization of the distance between any output 
and the corresponding ti' 
Finally, let us define the following 
Definition 6. z is a (Symmetrica[) Walrasian Equilibrium if 
E(z,nz) '" E(x,nz) Ifx E R . 
+ 
Now we are ready to prove a partial converse t~ Proposition 
1. 
Proposition 2. Let t* E interior TI' Ifi E N be a survivor. Let 
(y, ... , y, ny) e(t*, ... , t*). Then under Assumptions 2b), 
3-6, Y is a (Symmetrica[) Walrasian Equilibrium. 
Proof: First we notice that under AssumptionS 5, and 6 a Nash 
Equilibrium exists for any giveh .. t,,,, T since U.( ) is continUous 
L 
and concave on XI Ifi E N and 'the·strategy space for each firTTí ·can 
: be taken to be compact and convexo 
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1 
! 
Second we show that this Nash Equilibrium is unique for any 
given t E T. Suppose it is noto Let us denote by the superindex 1 
and 2 two arbitrary equil ibria. Notice that x 1 2 is impossible = x 
since R( ) strictly decreasing would imply that 1 2 on x x x I I I 
Ifi E N. Without loss of generality let that 1 > 2 us assume x x. 
Then, the first part of Assumption 6 implies that x: " x~, Ifi E N 
which is impossible since x = LIENXI• 
Third we note that the determinant of the matrix with typical 
element aH ;, aR i ( )/axI + aR/ )/ax and al] = aR i ( )/ax Ifj '" i is 
non 'vanishing, since aH rows and columns are [inearly independent 
(beca use Assumption 6 a)). Therefore e(t) is a continuously 
differentiable function in a vicinity or (t*, ... ,t*) (notice that 
t* is not an n-dimensional tuple but an el<:;ment of T/ 
Fourth we wiH 'prove that Ifi E N, Ifr = 1, ... ,k we have that 
ael(t*)/atlr '" ae/t*)/atlr, some j. Consider the necessary 
condition for a Nash Equilibrium R/y,ny,t*) = O. If the /h 
component of t* changes and the value of this function, says, 
increase, an increase of xI must imply a decrease of x (because 
Assumption 6 a) again) and vice versa. Therefore if x decrease, 
some j E N, (j '" i) must decrease as wel¡' 
FinaHy notice that if t* is a survivor it must be that 
be understood as an n - 1 dimensional tupl"",[ with identical 
components t*. Then, first order condition of the aboye 
maximization plus symmetry imply that 
aE(y,ny)/ax .(ae (t*)/at - ae (t*)/at ) 
1 1 ir f ir 
o 
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F:] 
From the result obtained in the fourth step al', ve setting 
j f we get 
8E(y,nyJ/8X¡ = O 
And Assumption 2b) implies that y is a Walrasian 
equilibrium .• 
It is easy to see that some Assumptions can be relaxed (i.e. 
interiority of all components of t*, etc.) without changing our 
conclusion. Notice too that these assumptions are not very strong. 
Two Remarks are in order. First, Proposition 2 does not 
assert that if we assume survivor types only, then each of these 
types are Walrasian. It just says that if a type is a survivor and 
we consider a profile which consists only of this type, if the 
resultant allocation is symmetrical, then it is Walrasian. Second, 
it would be tempting to interpret this Proposition saying that it 
shows that the Symmetrical Walrasian output is a survivor. 
However, this is only true when n=2 (see our comments on Shaffer's 
paper in the final Sectionl. 
Next we investigate the case in which we have economies of 
scale. In order to do that let us as sume the following. 
Assumption 7. 
that e (t O,t ) 
J J -J 
(Possibility of inaction) 
O, Vt e T . 
-J -J 
Vj e N, 3tO e T such 
J J 
A~sumption 8. Average costs are decreasing on output. 
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-
,,) 
Assumption 9. (Feasibility of Duopoly). If t. is a survivor type 
and t is a profile in which tr~ t., r = i,j and 
e/t) and e/t) are both positive. 
'rhen we have 
u 
t
O
, Vu * i,j 
u 
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 3-9 if n > 2 there are no 
survivors. 
Proof: Let us assume that contrarily to the Proposition we had a 
survivor, say t. Let us consider the allocation generated by a 
. 
profile in which firms i and j are of type t. and the rest of 
firms are inactive according to Ass'umption 7. Because of 
Assumption 9, Proposition 2 applies (with trivial modifications) 
to an economy consisting of two firms and therefore. 
8E(x , x)/8x = O, r =. i,j. 
r r 
But then Assumption 8 implies that E(xr,x) < O and is not 
a survivor since for inactive firms E(O,x) O .• 
The interpretation of Proposition 3 is clear. Active firms 
will engage in cut-throat price equals marginal cost competition 
and therefore they make losses. Then the optimal strategy for any 
firm from the point of view of survival is to be inactive. 
Proposition 3 suggests under which conditions a survivor may 
exists if increasing returns to scale are postulated: either we 
have a duopolistic market 01' reaction functions must, be 
discontinuous, i.e. assumptions 3-6 are violated. The first 
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alternative does not look very promisin~ since surv'ivor firms must 
be choosing an output for which price equals to marginal cost and 
therefore they are making losses (this follows from the first part 
of the proof of Propcisition 3). The second alternative seems risky 
since 'the existence of the mapping e( is not guaranteed. 
Therefore we turn our attention to a weaker notion, namely that of 
a successful type. First, let us define the following 
Definition 7. Firm j is said to be optimistic at the profile t if 
Definition 8. A profile t is said to be regular if 
a) There is a unique optimistic firm and 
b) There is a firm, say i, such that V/t) '" O. 
Then, we have the following 
Proposition 4. Let us assume 3-6 and 8. Then if j is an 
optimistic firm at a regular profile t =(t , .. t , .. t), t is a 
1 J n J 
successful type. 
Proof: It is easy to see that if average costs are decreasing on 
output it must be that Vi '* j. Also from 
Assumptions 3-6 e( ) is locatty continuous at t. Then, there is a 
b,att with radius d and center t such that Vt' E B(tJ,r) (\ T_
J -J -J 
we have that V (t ,t' )", V (t ,t') Vi '* j, V r < d .• 
I J J -J 1 J -J 
24, 
The interpretation of this Proposition is that in the 
short-run (Le. in a situation in which mutations are small), 
those firms with optimistic expectations will do better than those 
with rational or pessimistic expectati~:ms. 
This proposition bears sorne sirnilarity with a result obtained 
by Vickers (1985), Fershtman-Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) (see 
Corchón-Silva (1989) for a generalization of this result to 
conditions comparables to assumptions 3-6 aboye). They show that 
non profit-maximizer managers can earn greater profits than 
profit-maximizers managers Le. the profit-maximizing type is not 
Rational according with Definition 4 aboye. The explanation of 
this is that a more optimistic behavior causes a firm's reaction 
function to shift outwards, and up to, a point, this increases 
profits relative to the "Rational Expectations" point. However 
this sirnilarity is only apparent since a successful type is not 
necessarily rational according to Definition 4. Moreover in the 
case considered in Proposition 4 optimism is always good, which is 
not always the case in the rational approach. 
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5. FINAL COMMENTS 
There are three basic conclusion of our papero 
First, the link between to survive and "maximizing and 
informed", Le. rational, behavior is more subtle than it was 
thought. For instance Walrasian behavior (see Definition 6) 
implies Rational Expectations but it does not take advantage of 
all profitable opportunities (except in large economies) and 
therefore can not be fully rational. AIso, under economies of 
scale firms with Rational Expectations will be wiped out by firms 
with optimistic expectations. Finally it was shown that a rational 
profile is not necessarily composed of surviving types and 
viceversa. 
Second, if Walrasian Equilibrium exists, it is the unique 
possible outcome of the evolutive process irrespectively of the 
number of firms and the kind of postulated behavior. In this sense 
our theory differs from standard models in which a perfectly 
competitive outcome can only be guaranteed under strong 
assumptions about the behavior of firms (Le. Bertrand models) or 
the number 
models)6. 
of competitors in the market (Le. Cournot 
Third, the performance of the market is linked with the 
technological basis of the society. In other words, natural 
selection favors a behavior which is socially acceptable, Le. 
efficient, only. if economies of scale are small. In this sense our 
paper supports just partiallythe view that natural selection is a 
6 
However lt 
large number 
l~ng-run. 
! 
can be argued that we replace 
of I competltors by the assumpUon 
the assumptlon of a 
that we are in the 
J 
good screening mechanism in market economies. In particular 
industrial markets with strong economies of scale do not posses 
equilibrium in an evolutive sense and show tendency towards 
overproduction. Of course the right framework to analyze the last 
question is a full-fledged dynamiq model. EIsewhere (see 
Corchón-Vega (1990)) we have begun to build up such a model 
Summing up, the evolutive model developed in this paper 
produces quite definitive results on the kind of behavior which is 
more likely to persist in the long run, and provides a fresh angle 
to discuss questions like the foundation of rational behavior and 
the social merits of free competition. It must be remarked though 
that our approach is not free from shortcomings. Thus payoffs must 
be comparable among players for our definition of a survivor to be 
meaningful. AIso this concept makes sense only in the long-runo 
Therefore many questions concerning the impact of exogenous 
variables on price and output can not be answered in our 
framework. 
Previous contributions to the theory of evolutionary process 
in economics include Shubik (1954)7 (who studied a three person 
duel in which the fittest does not necessarily survive), Nelson 
and Winter (1982) and Shaffer (1989), who takes the closer 
approach to ours. In particular, he assumes no uncertainty and 
constant returns to scale and define a Symmetric Evolutionary 
7 
The idea behlnd Shubik's papel' ls similar to f i an oid chinese 
story: two warrlors flght for a treasure and kill each other. A 
pacifle flsherman observes that, and flnally collects the prlze 
(the story 15 called IIthe flshermar.t advantage ll ), However, lt 1s. 
disputable ir truly adverse selectlon oecurs In his model since as 
lt 18 suggested by the chinese story the pacifle player 18 In sorne 
sense the flttest. 1 owe this reference to Tomolchl Shlnotsuka. 
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Equilibrium (SEE) Ot is easy to show that a profile of surviving 
types is aSEE and that the converse is not necessarily true). 
Then, he proves that the symmetric Walrasian output is aSEE 
(actually, Jones (1980) obtained, in a very different framework, a 
similar result assuming that firms maximize an objective function 
which depends on the profits of all firms). It must be remarked, 
though, that Shaffer's results are different than our's since the 
asymmetrical Walrasian output is neither aSEE, nor a survivor 
type. Moreover, in a duopoly the symmetrical Walrasian output is a 
survivor (see Corchón-Vega (1990)) but with more than two firms it 
is not necessarily so. For instance if n=3, cost function is c.x
l 
and demand function reads p= b-x the symmetrical Walrasian output 
is (b-c)/3 but if firm 1 produces b, firm 2 produces a small 
quantity e, and firm 3 produces (b-c)/3 this output is not a 
survivor type since firm 2 has inferior losses. AIso if firm 
produces b-c-e (which is an asymmetrical Walrasian output) and 
firms 2 and 3 produce e each, for small values of e firm 1 is not 
choosing a survivor type. Therefore it is not .generally true that 
the Walrasian output is a survivor. Actually, what is proved in 
our paper is that the Walrasian behavior is a survivor. This 
illustrates that, in general, it is not possible to translate 
results from the type space to a direct space. 
Finally we remark that some interesting questions -as the 
consideration of discontinuous reaction functions, heterogeneous 
products or technological change- were not addressed in this 
papero We leave all this to future research. 
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